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Abstract
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variables thought to influence cross−country variations in sound recording piracy market
share. Sound recording piracy imposes significant costs on copyright owners, including
record companies, music publishers, recording artists and songwriters. The contribution of
this paper is the central role allocated to the affordability index (the ratio of legitimate price
to average hourly earnings) and to the balance of trade in sound recording product. The
estimated regression model identifies a positive and significant relationship between sound
recording PMS and the price−earnings (PE) ratio.
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1.  Introduction 
This paper explores the key factors thought to influence cross-country variations in sound 
recording piracy market share (PMS), which range from a low of 5% to 90% in the case of 
Australia and China respectively (IFPI, 2002). Sound recording piracy imposes significant costs 
on copyright owners, including record companies, recording artists and songwriters. While 
Internet piracy is a significant and growing phenomenon, physical sound recording piracy, which 
involves the mass production and smuggling of copyright infringing copies across national 
boarders, remains the dominant form of distribution in many countries. The International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) estimated losses from music piracy to be valued 
at US$4.3 billion (IFPI, 2002).  
 The empirical analysis presented herein examines the relative strength and significance 
of a range of institutional and economic variables thought to influence country specific piracy 
levels. Previous empirical studies of piracy have examined the influence of copyright convention 
membership, GDP per capita, corruption in the civil service and the strength of private property 
rights (Burke, 1996; Marron and Steel, 2000; Ronkainen and Guerrero-Cusumano, 2001). The 
contribution of this paper is the central role allocated to the to the affordability index (the ratio of 
legitimate price to average hourly earnings) and to the balance of trade in sound recording 
product. The estimated regression model identifies a positive and significant relationship 
between sound recording PMS and the price-earnings (PE) ratio. The model also suggests a 
direct (but insignificant) relationship between the balance of trade and PMS. 
2. International Sound Recording Piracy 
Sound recording piracy market share is the proportion of the domestic market accounted 
for by pirate product. This is obtained by taking the ratio of pirate sound recording sales to total 
sound recording sales (that is, pirate plus legitimate sound recording sales). Since piracy leaves 
no paper trail we must rely on estimates of sound recording piracy. Estimates of copyright piracy 
are published by the International Intellectual Property Association (IIPA) and the IFPI. Table 1 
presents country specific sound recording PMS estimates for 1998 and highlights  the 
considerable cross-country variations. The key question investigated in this paper is: what are the 
key factors that cause such significant variation in sound recording PMS? First, a brief review of 
other studies is presented. 
In an investigation of the relationship between international copyright conventions and 
piracy,  Burke (1996) investigates the empirical validity of the contention that international 
copyright conventions were an effective means of curtailing sound recording piracy.  In addition 
to convention membership and duration of membership, GDP per capita was included in the 
model to control for economic development. Economic development was expected to indicate 
“judicial and policing maturity” and be a reasonable proxy for i nstitutional support for IPR 
enforcement (Burke, 1996:63). Burke concluded that economic development (GDP per capita) 
rather than membership to the international conventions is the most important factor 
distinguishing nations with low versus high piracy market shares. However, when comparing 
nations with medium and high piracy market shares, the copyright convention membership 
dummy, and not GDP per capita, was found to be positive and significant. In empirical studies of 
cross-country software piracy, a number of variables have been explored, including economic 
development, cultural factors, the strength of economic institutions, research and development 
intensity, education levels and trade dependence (Marron and Steel, 2000; Ronkainen and 
Guerrero-Cusumano, 2001). In the latter study, GDP per capita was used to proxy ability to pay, 
while in the former it was used to proxy the strength of institutions and the protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPR). By contrast the present study adopts more suitable proxies for 
these key factors.  
  Specifically, this paper examines the relative importance of the following factors: 
international copyright convention membership and membership duration, IPR enforcement, 
corruption in the civil service, expected profit, affordability and the balance of trade in sound 
recordings. These variables are discussed sequentially and the theoretical rationale for their 
inclusion in the regression model outlined. 
2.1.  Membership to International Conventions 
Membership to an international copyright convention requires the signatory country to 
update domestic copyright laws to incorporate a set of minimum standards. As such, convention 2 
membership is a proxy for the comprehensiveness of domestic IPR laws and is expected to have 
a negative association with piracy market shares. Following Burke (1996) we propose that 
membership to the Berne, Rome and Geneva conventions respectively will result in lower levels 
of PMS. Membership to these conventions can be ascertained by inspecting the register of each 
convention (maintained by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)). For the 
purpose of estimating the regression model we assume a time lag of 5 years before convention 
membership will translate into a behavioural response at the market level and facilitate a 
reduction in piracy rates. 
The model hypothesises that membership duration is inversely related to PMS. A 
comprehensive copyright act is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the eradication of 
piracy. The assumption underlying this hypothesis is that governments in convention member 
countries will allocate the necessary resources to monitor the commercial importation and 
distribution of copyright infringing sound recordings. A further assumption is that these laws are 
enforced by customs officers, the police and the judiciary, and that the appropriate penalties are 
imposed so as to provide an effective deterrent to this illegal trade. The issue of enforcement and 
corruption may therefore warrant closer attention. 
2.2.  Enforcement 
It is proposed that higher levels of enforcement of IPR law lead to an increase in the 
probability of detection faced by smugglers of pirate product. This, in turn, increases the 
potential losses arising from the confiscation of infringing product and the imposition of 
financial penalties and/or a  prison term. We therefore hypothesise a negative relationship 
between the level of enforcement and PMS. In the absence of a measure of copyright 
enforcement we use a proxy variable for the enforcement of IPR; an index of property rights. A 
government’s commitment to the protection of physical property should provide a reasonable 
approximation of the likely level of protection of IPR. We can hypothesis that there is an inverse 
relationship between an index of private property rights and PMS. The property rights index 
measures the degree to which private property is protected and the degree to which a government 
enforces laws as they relate to private property. The index also incorporates a measure of the 
independence of the judiciary and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts 
(see Beach and O’Driscoll, 2001:57).
1 
2.3.  Corruption 
The model proposes that corruption in the customs authority, police and/or judiciary will 
result in a lower probability of detection and thereby, an increase in expected profit. That is, it is 
proposed that there is a direct relationship between the level of corruption in the civil service and 
the level of PMS. Kaufmann (et. al, 1999) construct a number of governance quality indicators. 
These indicators reflect the compilation of perceptions of the quality of governance derived from 
a survey of respondents in developing and industrialised countries alike, and includes responses 
from non-government organisations, commercial risk rating agencies and think tanks. The 
graft/corruption index is used as a proxy for the level of corruption in the civil service, including 
custom agents (armed with the responsibility of border controls) and the judiciary (police and 
prosecutors). Our empirical model proposes that the higher the level of corruption, the higher is 
PMS. 
2.4.  Expected Profit 
For a given marginal cost of production and export price, expected profit will primarily 
depend upon the probability of detection, the nature and size of penalties and the quantity sold, 
which in turn, will be a function of the strength of demand for pirate sound recordings. The 
strength of demand for pirate sound recordings depends on a number of factors, including 
legitimate product price, consumer preferences and the price and quality of pirate product. The 
higher the legitimate product price, the larger is residual demand; the proportion of the market 
that is excluded from participating in the consumption of legitimate product. In turn, the larger 
the number of consumers excluded from participating in the formal market, the larger the 
potential size of the informal market. Once established, the informal market will also attract 
consumers from the formal sector. The size of the informal or black market sector will partly 
                                                 
1 The better the level of protection the lower the index value (1 = very high protection) while a higher index 
number represents inferior protection (5 = very low protection). 
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determine the level of expected profit. This suggests that the existing size of the informal market 
within which pirate sound recordings are distributed, might be a suitable proxy for the strength of 
demand for pirate product and thereby, the level of expected profit. Our empirical  model 
proposes that the higher the black market index (BM), the higher the piracy market share. 
2.5.  Balance of Trade in Sound Recording Product 
By displacing relatively high priced legitimate product, pirate sound recordings can help 
improve the balance of trade with respect to copyright product. For a nation that is a net-importer 
of copyright product, smuggling of copyright infringing product can be welfare enhancing. This 
may help to explain why some governments officially oppose piracy but seemingly tolerate it 
unofficially. Sound recording royalty and license fee data is not available. The proxy variable 
chosen is total royalty and license fees recorded in the services account. This represents 
payments and receipts for the authorised use of intangible assets and property rights, such as 
copyright, trademarks and brand names. The data is obtained from the IMF Balance of Payments 
Statistics Yearbook (2000).
2 The model proposes that there is a direct relationship between the 
royalty and license fee trade deficit and PMS. 
2.6.  Affordability 
Consumers, particularly those in low-income countries, might be priced out of the market 
for sound recordings. That is, legitimate product price will be set above the marginal valuation 
placed on sound recordings by many consumers. Marginal valuation is a function of both 
preferences and income. The model proposes that the higher the product price relative to income, 
the higher the level of piracy. We propose to measure affordability by taking the ratio of 
legitimate product price to average hourly earnings (the PE ratio) as illustrated in equation 1.
3 
Our proxy variable for affordability is the price earnings index (PE): 
 
                    (1) 
 
The empirical model proposes that there is a direct relationship between the PE ratio and 
PMS. For estimation purposes we chose to use the square root of the PE ratio. The rationale for 
this is that demand is expected to be more elastic the higher the price of the product relative to 
income. For low wage countries we expect the demand for pirate product to increase more than 
proportionately to an increase in the PE ratio and visa versa.
4 
                                                 
2 There is however, a potential problem with using reported data on royalty and license payments. The 
displacement of legitimate sales will lower the value of import payments reported in the current account. For a net-
importer of copyright product, high levels of piracy will have a significant beneficial effect on the balance of trade 
in copyright (lowering the deficit). Official data will therefore understate the true level of dependence of foreign 
copyright product. Accordingly, we use a weighted trade balance variable to compensate for this effect. 
3 Average price for full-price (Top 40 chart) sound recordings in the numerous countries included in the 
study are unavailable. The proxy used is the average sound recording price in each country. Data on sales volumes 
(units) and retail sales revenue is obtained from the IFPI publication The Record Industry in Numbers (1999). 
Average price is obtained by dividing total sales revenue by total sales volume for each country. The second 
component of the PE ratio is hourly earnings. Earnings vary greatly from one individual to the next. This earnings 
disparity is universal. To avoid this problem we use average hourly wage rates in manufacturing as our proxy 
variable for hourly earnings. Average hourly manufacturing wage rates are obtained from the International Labour 
Office (ILO), Bulletin of Labour Statistics (2000). 
4 A number of missing values for the PE variable were estimated by using a regional average PE ratio. For 
example, the missing value for Costa Rica was obtained by taking the Central American regional average PE ratio. 
The rationale for this procedure is that the use of regional averages (rather than the sample mean) provides a more 
accurate measure of affordability. These countries are at similar stages of economic development, have similar 
standard of living and wages, and relatively uniform sound recording prices (according to anecdotal evidence from 
various industry sources). 
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3. Model and Estimation Procedure 
We assume that the true model is nested within a general model which we specify as: 
 
i i i i i i i i i i i i i PE BOT BM COR PR YG G YR R YB B PMS e k f m h d y n v l g a b + + + + + + + + + + + = +   (2) 
 
where 
PMSi  =  piracy market share: the proportion of the market for sound recordings 
accounted for by pirate product 
Bi  =  Berne convention membership dummy,  i = 1, 0 
YBi   =  years of membership to the Berne convention 
Ri  =  Rome Convention membership dummy,  i = 1, 0 
YRi   =  years of membership to the Rome Convention 
Gi  =  Geneva convention membership dummy,  i = 1, 0 
YGi   =  years of membership to the Geneva convention 
PR  =  Property rights index 
CORi   =  index of corruption 
BOTi   =  trade specialisation index 
BMi   =  index of black market activity 
PE
2
i    =  ratio of the average price of legitimate product to average hourly 
manufacturing wages (squared) 
 
The hypothesised signs of the coefficients are b, ,g, l, w, n, y, d, < 0, while h, f, m, k > 0. We 
estimate the empirical model using 1998 cross-section data on estimated sound recording piracy 
market shares in 84 countries. We have elected to use the IFPI data set for the estimation of our 
model. However, to increase the sample size we have included country specific PMS estimates 
from the IIPA data set not included in the IFPI data. This produces a sample size of 84 
countries.
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Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients of the general model together with regression 
diagnostics. Inspecting Table 2 we find that the t statistics for the general model are mixed and 
range from relatively weak, in the case of the Berne membership regressor (B), to significant, in 
the case of the property rights index (PR) and the Geneva convention membership dummy (G). 
In estimating the specific model we apply a backward stepwise removal method, deleting at each 
step the variable with the weakest t statistic. The specific model generated from this procedure is 
presented in Table 2, along with diagnostic tests. The Property Rights index and Geneva 
Convention membership dummy are significant at the 1 percent level. Years of membership to 
the Berne convention is significant at the 5 percent level, while the PE ratio is significant at the 
10 percent level.  
Diagnostic tests for normality and multicollinearity are satisfactory. Table 2 also presents 
multicollinearity diagnostics, including Pearson correlation coefficients, eigen value conditional 
indices and variance inflation factors (VIF). In the absence of a critical value tests for hypotheses 
regarding multicollinearity, we rely on rules of thumb, which suggest the parsimonious model is 
not compromised by multicollinearity. The regression standardised residuals behave normally, 
with a standard deviation of 1.04 and a mean of –0.02. The Adjusted R
2 reveals that the specific 
model explains approximately 69 percent of the variation in cross-country PMS. Examination of 
the residuals statistics reveal only a relatively small proportion of predicted values lie outside the 
range of zero and 100.  
Prior to discussing the preferred parsimonious model in greater detail we discuss the 
issue of suspected multicollinearity between the Corruption, Black Market and Property Rights 
indices. Pearson correlations coefficients for these variables range from 0.78 and 0.91. Other 
diagnostic tests for multicollinearity presented in Table  2 also suggest the existence of 
multicollinearity between these regressors. The existence of multicollinearity between 
independent variables can be dealt with by either dropping one or more of the “offending’ 
variables or by constructing a composite index of the related variables. 
Model (2) presented in Table 3 is estimated after dropping the PR regressor (which is 
highly correlated to both  BM and COR) from the general model in an attempt to address the 
                                                 
5 The correlation coefficient for the two estimates of piracy market share is 0.92, indicating that the two 
estimates are highly correlated. The similarity of the piracy estimates from two alternate sources provides greater 
confidence in the accuracy of the data and the methodology used by each organisation to estimate PMS across a 
range of divergent countries. 5 
observed multicollinearity. Not unexpectedly, the BM regressor now enters the model and is 
significant at the 1% level. The PE
2 regressor enters Model (2) with a 5% level of significance, 
slightly stronger as compared with Model (1) where this regressor  has a 10% level of 
significance. The alternative to dropping a correlated regressor is to construct a composite index 
of COR, BM and PR. Specific Model (3) replaces the COR, BM and PR indices with a composite 
of these variables, INST.
6 Not surprisingly, the INST regressor enters the Specific Model (3) as 
the most significant variable. Relative to Model (1), the PE
2 and G regressors remain relatively 
unchanged and are significant at the 5% and 10% level respectively. In conclusion, the alternate 
approaches of dropping a highly correlated independent variable versus constructing a composite 
variable is of little consequence to the overall results. 
4. Results 
The specific model reveals that an increase in the Property Rights index of 1 unit 
(signifying a deterioration in the level of protection) results in an 18 point increase in PMS. With 
a t statistic of 5.955, the Property Rights index is the most significant variable in the model. This 
is consistent with our hypothesis, which proposes that higher levels of IPR enforcement (low 
index value) are associated with lower levels of PMS. By comparison, Model (3) reveals that an 
increase in the composite index by one unit produces an increase in PMS by an average of 20.5 
points. This provides support for our hypothesis that corruption in the civil service (customs 
control, judiciary and policing) would have a significant impact on the probability of detection, 
the risk:return ratio and the expected profit of the smuggling firm. The strength of the composite 
index regressor also provides support for the proposition that the size of black market operations 
in a country also impact directly with the level of observed PMS. 
The model suggests that membership to the Geneva convention lowers PMS by 16.8 
points. This is consistent with our hypothesis which proposes that membership to an international 
copyright convention will result in improved copyright protection in member country national 
markets and, thereby, lower PMS. As hypothesised we observe an inverse relationship between 
years of membership to the Berne convention and PMS. An increase in membership by 10 years 
lowers PMS by 1.6 points. While statistically significant at the 5 percent level, the size of the 
coefficient suggests that membership duration brings relatively modest improvements in 
domestic IPR protection. Considered together with the Geneva convention membership dummy, 
these results suggest that membership to an international copyright convention provide sizable 
short-term reductions in PMS (approximately 17 points) as national governments upgrade 
institutional support for IPR. Thereafter, relatively modest improvements in IPR protection can 
be expected as membership duration increases. 
We observe a direct relationship between the PE ratio and PMS. This provides evidence for 
the hypothesis that the higher the price of legitimate sound recordings relative to income, the 
larger the level of residual (or unsatisfied) demand, and subsequently the level of piracy. This 
residual demand represents a market opportunity for distributors of pirate sound recordings. 
Consumers with marginal valuations below the legitimate price (reflecting, in part, low relative 
wage rates) can satisfy this unmet demand by purchasing relatively low priced pirate product. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Our estimated regression equation is consistent with the predictions of our theoretical 
analysis. The positive relationship between the price-earnings ratio and piracy market share 
supports the hypothesis that piracy levels increase as sound recordings become less affordable 
for music enthusiasts. The higher the price-earnings ratio, the higher the residual demand for 
sound recordings. This residual demand represents a black market opportunity and raises 
expected profit for smugglers and distributors of pirate sound recordings. The model therefore 
lends support to our hypothesis that the higher the level of expected profit, the higher is piracy 
market share. Affordability, it would seem, is an important determinant of the relative level of 
estimated piracy market shares. 
The model also predicted that the higher the level of corruption and black market activity, 
the higher the level of sound recording piracy. The significance of the composite index provides 
                                                 
6 The individual indices had to be adjusted so that an increase in the INST index value corresponded to 
lower levels of IPR protection and higher levels of corruption and black market operations. 6 
strong support for this hypothesis.
7 The model also supports the hypothesis that the better the 
level of protection of private property rights, and the degree to which government enforces these 
laws, the lower the level of sound recording piracy.  In addition, we find  support for the 
hypothesis of a direct (but relatively weak) relationship between foreign copyright dependence 
and PMS. 
In conclusion, our model supports the proposition that both domestic and international 
institutions are important in influencing the level of sound recording PMS. A major contribution 
of our model is the inclusion of economic factors, specifically a measure of affordability and a 
nation’s dependence on foreign copyright product. The regression model of cross-country 
variations in piracy market share is supportive of the numerous hypotheses examined. The 
implications are that copyright owner efforts to reduce sound recording piracy should focus not 
only on the efficacy of national government enforcement regimes, but also on pricing strategies, 
particularly in low income countries. 
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Table 1  International Piracy Rates: 1998 
Country  Piracy Market 
Share 
Country  Piracy Market 
Share 
Austria              5  Thailand             35 
Belgium              5  Venezuela            35 
Canada               5  Slovenia             37 
Denmark              5  Israel               40 
France               5  Poland               40 
Germany              5  South Africa  40 
Ireland              5  Saudi Arabia  45 
Japan                5  Egypt                50 
Netherlands          5  Kuwait               50 
New Zealand  5  Latvia               50 
Norway               5  Lithuania            50 
Portugal             5  Mexico               50 
Slovakia             5  China                56 
Spain                5  Bulgaria             60 
Sweden               5  Colombia             60 
Switzerland          5  Hong Kong            60 
UK                   5  Malaysia             70 
Czech Republic  6  Russia               75 
Australia            7  Ukraine              75 
USA                  7  Bolivia              85 
Indonesia            12  Estonia              85 
Chile                17  Jordan               85 
Finland              17  Peru                 85 
Hungary              17  Azerbaijan           90 
South Korea          17  Romania              90 
Singapore            19  Turkmenistan         90 
Italy                20  Belarus              95 
Philippines          20  Brazil               95 
Greece               25  Kazakhstan           95 
India                30  Pakistan             95 
Turkey               30  Vietnam              99 
Argentina            35     
Source: IIPA (1999) 8 
Table 2 Sound Recording Piracy Model 
Dependent Variable  Piracy Market Share 
Estimation Method  Ordinary Least Squares 
 
General Model  Coefficient   Std. Error   t-Ratio        
(Prob)  
VIF 
Intercept  3.415  13.687  .249 (.804)    
G  -21.194  11.371  -1.864 (.070)  4.944 
YG  .483  .511  .944 (.351)  3.828 
R  -5.116  8.958  -.571 (.571)  3.198 
YR  .182  .374  .487 (.629)  2.405 
B  1.696  10.771  .157 (.876)  1.629 
YB  -.157  .097  -1.614 (.114)  2.301 
PE
2  .295  .204  1.448 (.155)  2.021 
COR  -2.008  5.895  -.341 (.735)  4.537 
BM  1.682  4.105  .410 (.684)  4.530 
PR  16.042  5.014  3.200 (.003)  3.809 
BOT  0.001328  .001  1.366 (.180)  1.931 
 
R
2 
 
0.739 
     
Adj R
2  0.667       
F-stat 
S.E. 
10.296 (0.00) 
17.95 
     
N = 52 
Table 3 Parsimonious Model 
Dependent Variable  Piracy Market Share 
Estimation Method  Ordinary Least Squares 
Regressor  Coefficient  S.E.  t-Ratio 
(Prob) 
Eigen-value   Cond.  
Index 
VIF 
Intercept  8.844  8.647  1.023 
(.312) 
3.653  1.000   
G  -16.812  5.218  -3.222 
(.002) 
.815  2.117  1.105 
YB  -.158  .075  -2.094 
(.042) 
.300  3.487  1.459 
PE
2  .336  .179  1.878 
(.067) 
.182  4.479  1.652 
PR  18.084  3.037  5.955 
(.000) 
.0491  8.625  1.483 
 
R
2 
 
0.711 
         
Adj R
2  0.687           
F-stat 
SE 
28.923 (.000) 
17.41 
         
 Residuals  
Statistics                Minimum        Maximum     Mean      Std Deviation 
Predicted Value  -6.83  105.94  44.10  44.10     
Residual  -64.47  40.63  -0.48  18.81     
Std Predicted 
Value 
-1.575  2.725  0.367  1.157     
Std Residual  -3.702  2.333  -0.028  1.081     
N = 84 
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Table 4 Summary Table: Specific Models 
Dependent Variable  Piracy Market Share 
Estimation Method  Ordinary Least Squares 
Regressor  (1)
 a  (2)
a  (3)
 a 
Intercept  8.844 (1.023) 
 
-2.882 (-0.349) 
 
-7.468 (-0.931) 
 
G  -16.82* (-3.222) 
 
  -14.314** (-2.607) 
 
R    -13.005** (-2.156) 
 
 
YB  -0.158** (-2.094) 
 
   
PE
2  0.336*** (1.878)   
 
0.432** (2.071) 
 
0.347*** (1.851) 
 
 
BM    9.729* (3.291) 
 
 
PR  18.084* (5.955) 
 
   
BOT    0.00231**  (2.526) 
 
 
COMP      20.524* (6.243) 
 
GDP       
N =   84  52  84 
 
R
2 
 
0.739 
 
0.636 
 
0.674 
Adj R
2  0.667  0.605  0.654 
SE 
F (Sig) 
17.94 
28.923 
(.000) 
19.56 
20.491 
(.000) 
18.29 
33.127 
(.000) 
a.  t-Ratios in brackets 
*     significant at the 0.01 level 
**   significant at the 0.05 level 
*** significant at the 0.10 level 
 
(1) Specific Model, as presented in Table 1 
(2) Specific Model: after removing the PR regressor 
(3) Specific Model: substituting the composite index (COMP) for PR, BM and COR 
 